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— Franks & Zalev - This Week in Family Law

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Contents

Breaking News

We all know that, historically, the Supreme Court of Canada does not often grant leave in family law cases. So we were all happy/surprised when leave was granted in *Graydon v. Michel* (2018), 19 R.F.L. (8th) 26 (B.C. C.A.) and *Colucci v. Colucci* (2019), 26 R.F.L. (8th) 259 (Ont. C.A.).

But *then* the Supreme Court of Canada granted leave in *Richardson v. Richardson* (2019), 35 R.F.L. (8th) 265 (Ont. C.A.) from the Ontario Court of Appeal (about whether a trial judge is bound to accept a mid-trial agreement as to custody) - see the 2020-14 (April 13, 2020) edition of *TWFL*.

And then the Supreme Court of Canada granted leave to appeal *Barendregt v. Grebliunas* (2021), 50 R.F.L. (8th) 1 (B.C. C.A.) (a mobility decision where post-trial evidence was considered by the appellate court) - see the 2021-19 (May 17, 2021) edition of *TWFL*.

So at that time, there were two family law cases pending in the Supreme Court of Canada.

At the risk of sounding like a Ron Popeil Chop-O-Matic commercial - but wait, there's more!!

On June 17, 2021, the Supreme Court of Canada granted leave to appeal in two more cases, one from the Prince Edward Island Court of Appeal in *J.D. v. DCP, et al*, 2020 CarswellPEI 73 (C.A.) (https://www.scc-csc.ca/case-dossier/info/sum-som-eng.aspx?cas=39558) and the other from the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal in *Alansari v. Kreke*, 2020 CarswellSask 522 (C.A.) (https://www.scc-csc.ca/case-dossier/info/sum-som-eng.aspx?cas=39567). This brings the total number of family law cases currently pending before the Supreme Court of Canada to four. An embarrassment of family law riches.

We cannot remember the last time this many family law cases were pending before the Supreme Court, but hopefully this is the start of a trend and not just a blip. There are many areas of family law that could use a "revisit" from the highest court in the land.

J.D. is a child protection case where the Court was called upon to decide whether to place a young child with his biological father or his maternal grandmother. The trial judge placed the child with the maternal grandmother because, although both the father and grandmother were essentially equal in their ability to parent, she was concerned that the father would not promote a relationship between the child and the grandmother and his older half-brother.

In reversing the trial judge's decision, the majority of the Court of Appeal concluded that "in cases where, after consideration of all relevant factors, the answer is unclear such as the case where the parent and the non-parent are more or less equal or

comparatively equal, or perhaps even where the case for the non-parent is slightly better, the natural parent factor should be decisive."

The dissent would have dismissed the appeal, as it was not persuaded that the father had established any errors that were sufficient to overcome the deferential standard of review that applies in child protection cases.

Alansari is a mobility case. The parties lived in Lloydminster and had a young son together. After they separated, the mother commenced a proceeding to allow her to move to Saskatoon, which is approximately 275 km away from the family's home in Lloydminster.

The trial judge found that it would be in the child's best interests to move to Saskatoon with the mother, and granted her request to relocate.

The father appealed. While the Court of Appeal was satisfied that the trial judge had correctly determined that the mother was the child's psychological parent and should remain his primary parent, it found that the trial judge had erred by not specifically considering whether and why moving to Saskatoon would actually benefit the child, or would overcome the detriments of moving. As the mother and child had already moved to Saskatoon approximately 15 months earlier, and as the parties had not filed updated evidence about the child's best interests, the Court concluded that it was necessary to order a new trial.

Having granted leave in both *J.D.* and *Alansari*, it appears that the Supreme Court may have decided that the time has come to revisit the "material error" standard of review that it established in *Van de Perre v. Edwards* (2001), 19 R.F.L. (5th) 396 (S.C.C.) at paras. 13-15 for cases involving the best interests of a child.

As both cases deal with the standard of review that applies in appeals involving the best interests of a child, and as leave was granted in both cases on the same day, we would not be surprised if the Supreme Court decides to hear both cases together.

Access and Improper Delegation and the CAS

J.S.R. v. Children's Aid Society of Ottawa, 2021 CarswellOnt 982 (Div. Ct.) - Shelston, Kristjanson and Favreau, JJ.

Can an access order be at the discretion of a society? The case law has been divided, but a panel of the Ontario Divisional Court seems to have finally answered the question.

After a protection trial, the Court ordered that two children were to be placed in the society's care. The mother, an older sibling, and the maternal grandmother were allowed access, which was ordered to be at the discretion of the society and in accordance with the best interests of the children.

The mother appealed. She asked that the children be placed in her custody with society supervision. In the alternative, she asked for specific access to both children if they were to remain in the care of the society.

Section 74(3) of the *Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017*, S.O. 2017, c. 14, Sched. 1 (the "*CYFSA*") set out the factors a court is to use when considering the best interests of a child. Section 104 of the *CYFSA* mandates that a court determine access in a child's best interests. Specifically, s. 104(1) states:

> **Access order**
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> 104 (1) The court may, in the child's best interests,
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> (a) when making an order under this Part; or
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> (b) upon an application under subsection (2),
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> make, vary or terminate an order respecting a person's access to the child or the child's access to a person, and may impose such terms and conditions on the order as the court considers appropriate.

Although a plain reading of the section suggests that "the court" makes orders for, and imposes conditions regarding, access, two streams of case law have evolved on ordering "access at the discretion of the society." The question then became, having found that access in favour of the mother was in the best interests of the child, could the court delegate all aspects of that access - including decisions about type, frequency, and duration - to the society?

The two lines of cases were reviewed by Justice Harper in *C.A.S. v. K.D.D.*, 2020 CarswellOnt 1592 (S.C.J.). The first line of cases found it to be an error in law for a court to delegate a child's access at the discretion of a society. In *K.D.D.*, Justice Harper stated:

> [45] I am of the view that a court cannot and should not delegate its exercise of discretion when ordering access. It is the court that must balance and evaluate the evidence within the consideration of the factors set out in the statute. Expediency cannot override such considerations.
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> [46] I am also of the view that in certain circumstances, after the court has made the determination that access is appropriate, it may be necessary to set out certain parameters and guidelines to a party who may be placed in a position of having to facilitate that access given the unique circumstances of each case that is presented a court.

Many other judges of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice agree with this view, believing it to be improper delegation of the jurisdiction of the court: *Children's Aid Society of Toronto v. N.N.*, 2017 CarswellOnt 19171 (C.J.); *Childrens Aid Society of Toronto v. P. (D.)*, 2005 CarswellOnt 11499 (S.C.J.); *Children's Aid Society of Toronto v. O. (B.)* (2003), 45 R.F.L. (5th) 131 (Ont. C.J.); *Children's Aid Society of Toronto v. C.B.* (July 23, 2007), Doc. C32280/05 (Ont. C.J.); and *Children's Aid Society of London & Middlesex v. C. (G.)*, 2001 CarswellOnt 5542 (S.C.J.).

The second stream of cases supported an award of access at the discretion of the society. In those cases, as in this one, the society argued that it is statutorily mandated to supervise children in its care, thereby permitting courts to allow the society to exercise discretion with respect to an individual's access. In support of that position, the society relied on *H. (C.) v. Children's Aid Society of Durham (County)* (2003), 37 R.F.L. (5th) 124 (Ont. Div. Ct.):

> [19] The parent-child relationship is dynamic, always changing. Where an application for protection has been commenced, the relationship may also be difficult. Maximum flexibility is required to respond to the family's ongoing needs on a day-to-day basis. That would not be in the children's best interest.
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> [20] The Society has the statutory mandate and expertise to deal with these day-to-day issues. It is thus appropriate to leave the day-to-day discretion with it.

This argument is not without some merit. However, the Divisional Court in this case distinguished *H. (C.) v. Children's Aid Society of Durham (County)* on the basis that the decision there was an appeal of a *temporary* order made at a *temporary* care and custody hearing.

And, as noted by the Divisional Court, that discretion cannot simply be delegated to a society - or to anyone else for that matter:

> [51] A judicial decision that delegates the discretionary elements of access including type, frequency, and duration to a Society offends the principle against sub-delegation: *Canada (Attorney General) v. Brent*, 1956 CanLII 5, [1956] S.C.R. 318 (S.C.C.) at 321. It is a decision to delegate discretionary adjudicative authority to a nonjudicial actor where the power is statutorily reserved to a judicial decision-maker. We adopt the comments of Goodman, J. with respect to a previous version of the statute: *Children's Aid Society of Toronto v. P. (D.)*, 2005 CarswellOnt 922, [2005] O.J. No. 930 (Ont. S.C.J.) at para. 40, *rev'd on other grounds*, *Children's Aid Society of Toronto v. P. (D.)* [2005 CarswellOnt 4579 (Ont. C.A.)], 2005 CanLII 34560:
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> > Yet, I do find it difficult to accept that the legislature ever intended to leave decisions regarding access to children in the hands of one of the litigants, itself, particularly where children have no right of access to their parents unless an order for access is made under Part III . . . While I can certainly understand some of the reasons why it would be

> efficient, time-and or cost-wise to delegate access issues to the CAS, children and their parents have a right, in my view, to have decisions in respect of access made in an objective and neutral manner. **One would expect that it would be rare, if ever, that legislation would authorize a court to delegate its judicial functions to any third party who/which is a party to the litigation, when neutrality and objectivity are so vital to the decision-making process**. In my view, simply put and at least on a final basis, the CFSA does not permit, either expressly or by implication, the court to delegate its authority to make orders in respect of access under section 58 to any person or entity, including the CAS. [emphasis added]
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> . . . . .
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> [54] We find that granting a Society the discretion to determine the type, frequency and duration of access, including whether access will take place at all, is an inappropriate delegation of the court's role to determine access terms and conditions pursuant to section 104 and 105 of the *CYFSA*.

Therefore, it now appears that different rules may apply for "access at the discretion of the society" depending on whether the order is being made at a temporary or final hearing.

However, the Divisional Court did make it clear that a society does have some discretion once access has been ordered. According to the Divisional Court:

> [55] . . . it is important to distinguish between discretionary "visits" and the right of access resting in access holders. As the Court of Appeal held in *Children's Aid Society of Toronto v. P. (D.)*, 2005 CanLII 34560 at para. 12, a Society has "the right to control who may visit the children and when," as would a custodial parent. For example, **if the access order stipulates in-person visits six times a year for an hour, a Society retains the discretion to grant additional visits, or to supplement in-person visits with additional written communication. In this sense, the right of access granted by a court may be supplemented by a Society's discretionary decisions about visits. But the minimum rights of access must be established by the court**. [emphasis added]

The appeal was allowed and the issue of access was remitted back to the trial judge.

Rodney Dangerfield: "I tells ya . . . Judgment Creditors . . . They Don't Get No Respect . . . "

Iafolla v. Lasota (2020), 48 R.F.L. (8th) 467 (Ont. S.C.J.) - Schabas J., rev'd in part (2021), 53 R.F.L. (8th) 259 (Ont. C.A.) - Benotto, Rouleau and Miller JJ.A.

The applicant, Iafolla, obtained a judgment against the respondent's ex-husband, Antonov, in relation to a motor vehicle accident in which Antonov was uninsured. The judgment was signed on **June 6, 2016** in the amount of $380,071.23.

At the time of the accident, Antonov was married to the respondent, Lasota. They were joint tenants of their matrimonial home, located on Savona Drive in Toronto, where they lived with their child.

On **October 3, 2017**, Lasota commenced divorce proceedings against Antonov in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice.

On **November 28, 2017**, Iafolla filed a Writ of Seizure and Sale against the matrimonial home.

On **July 25, 2018**, following an uncontested divorce trial, Antonov was ordered to pay Lasota child support of $1,429 a month, and child support arrears of $14,290. Antonov was also ordered to pay spousal support of $3,191 a month, and spousal support arrears of $24,360.

The Divorce Order further directed that the matrimonial home be sold and the net proceeds divided into two equal shares. However, the Court directed that Antonov's share should be reduced by the arrears, an equalization payment of $28,408, and costs of $12,279. The Court further ordered that the remaining balance of Antonov's share of the proceeds be held in trust as security for his future child and spousal support obligations. Specifically, paragraph 19 of the Divorce Order stated:

> The remaining balance of [Antonov's] share of the net proceeds of the sale of the Matrimonial Home, if any, shall be held in trust as security for [Antonov's] future child and spousal support obligations.

Justice Backhouse, in granting the Divorce Order, was not made aware of the judgment against Antonov (remember, this was an uncontested trial so Antonov was not present) or the Writ against the matrimonial home. Lasota said that she did not know about the judgment or the Writ.

In **September 2018**, the matrimonial home was sold for $880,000, with a closing on **November 30, 2018**. Prior to the closing, however, it was necessary to have the Writ discharged, which is how Iafolla became aware of the Divorce Order.

The net proceeds of the sale totalled $594,273.30. Lasota and Iafolla agreed that following the payments from Antonov's share as directed by Justice Backhouse, and payment of an additional eight months of support, the $180,670.15 balance of Antonov's share of the proceeds would be placed in trust without prejudice to Iafolla's right to bring an application to determine priority to those funds.

Antonov did not make any of the ordered support payments. At the time of the motion before Justice Schabas, his arrears were over $100,000.

Iafolla argued that he was entitled to the full amount of $180,670.15 pursuant to s. 2 of the *Creditors' Relief Act, 2010*, S.O. 2010, c.16, Sched. 4, (the "*CRA*"). He urged that the Divorce Order be set aside to the extent that it interfered with his *CRA* rights.

Lasota argued that the court had no jurisdiction to vary the Divorce Order outside the divorce proceedings, and that the Writ and the *CRA* afforded Iafolla no substantive right to the funds.

This area of the law is not well settled, and the parties relied on conflicting lines of cases.

Iafolla relied on the *CRA* to support his argument that Lasota had no priority to the funds, and on decisions in matrimonial proceedings which prevent courts from making retroactive orders to defeat creditors of a spouse.

Section 2 of the *CRA* states:

> 2. (1) Except as otherwise provided in this Act, there is no priority among creditors by execution or garnishment issued by the Superior Court of Justice, the Family Court of the Superior Court of Justice and the Ontario Court of Justice.
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> . . . . .
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> **Exception, support or maintenance orders**
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> (3) A support or maintenance order has the following priority over other judgment debts, other than debts owing to the Crown in right of Canada, ***regardless of when an enforcement process is issued*** or served:
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> 1. If the maintenance or support order requires periodic payments, the order has priority to the extent of all arrears owing under the order at the time of seizure or attachment.
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> 2. If the support or maintenance order requires the payment of a lump sum, the order has priority to the extent of any portion of the lump sum that has not been paid. [***emphasis*** added]

The effect of this section is to give priority to support orders that involve a lump sum, or require periodic payments, but only to the extent that those periodic payments are in arrears or the lump sum has not yet been paid. This easily explained why Iafolla consented to the payment of the amounts ordered by Justice Backhouse. However, following that payment which cleared the arrears to that date, Iafolla argued that no further priority existed, and that he was entitled to collect on his judgment.

Iafolla relied on *Maroukis v. Maroukis* (1981), 24 R.F.L. (2d) 113 (Ont. C.A.), aff'd (1984), 41 R.F.L. (2d) 113 (S.C.C.). In *Maroukis*, the judge at first instance ordered that the matrimonial home, previously acquired in joint tenancy, vested with the wife at the date of separation, and that any executions on the property did not affect her title to it. This had the effect of defeating the husband's creditors who had obtained judgments and filed executions on the property *after* the date of separation but *before* the judge's order vesting title retroactively. The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge had no jurisdiction to make such a retroactive order since the house had been held in joint tenancy when the executions were filed and attached to the husband's interest. The Supreme Court of Canada agreed with the Court of Appeal.

In a similar vein, in *Ferguson v. Ferguson* (1994), 7 R.F.L. (4th) 384 (Ont. U.F.C.) (which followed *Maroukis*) the Court found that a writ of execution for the husband's debt, filed *before* the order that the house be sold and proceeds divided, had priority over any claim that the wife had to the husband's net proceeds of the sale of the matrimonial home. And in *M.J.C. Investment Corp. v. Cole*, 2013 CarswellOnt 19098 (S.C.J.), the Court noted that while the *CRA did* grant priority to orders for support and maintenance over execution judgments, it *did not* do so without regarding to the timing of the support order; a vesting order that provided a spouse with title was, therefore, subject to any valid encumbrancers or registered execution creditors with an interest in the lands at the time the vesting order was made.

These decisions, along with the general tenor of *McCoy v. Hucker*, 1998 CarswellOnt 2919 (Gen. Div.) (a constructive trust should not be used as a tactical tool in family law cases) and *Thibodeau v. Thibodeau* (2011), 5 R.F.L. (7th) 16 (Ont. C.A.), certainly suggest that, with respect to priority, timing is everything.

As a result, Iafolla argued that Justice Backhouse's order that the balance of Antonov's proceeds be held in trust to be available to cover arrears was subject to Iafolla's right to collect on his judgment from that sum. Iafolla argued that, had Justice Backhouse been aware of the writ, she could not have made an order overriding its effect. Consequently, it was not even necessary to vary the Divorce Order, but simply declare that Iafolla had an entitlement to the proceeds at the material time.

Lasota did not contest the authority of the above cases, but argued that Iafolla's motion had to be brought as an intervener in the matrimonial proceeding. Section 17 of the *Divorce Act* provides that a support order "or any provision thereof" can only be varied on application by spouses, unless leave of the court is granted.

Lasota relied on *Stevens v. Stevens* (2005), 20 R.F.L. (6th) 453 (Ont. S.C.J.), in which *Maroukis* and *Ferguson* were distinguished as cases determined under provincial family law statutes which did not permit retroactive orders - whereas the creation of a trust is/was based on the court's equitable jurisdiction. In *Stevens*, a *retroactive* vesting order was found to prevail over a writ filed by a bank. In *Stevens*, it was also held that only a party to a proceeding was entitled to apply for an order to amend or vary a judgment. The Court of Appeal agreed that the judge who had made the vesting order invoked the court's equitable jurisdiction, distinguishing it from *Maroukis* and *Ferguson*: *Stevens v. Stevens* (2006), 28 R.F.L. (6th) 243 (Ont. C.A.). *Silver v. Silver et al*, 2017 ONSC 7749 also suggests that funds placed in trust for future support payments have priority over an execution creditor.

Justice Schabas agreed with Lasota. He determined that Justice Backhouse was rightfully concerned about Antonov's willingness to comply with his court-ordered support obligations and used her equitable jurisdiction to craft her Divorce Order to create a trust to protect Lasota's right to obtain support from Antonov. That order then had priority over Iafolla's interest, which was subject to "all the equities": *Ontario Development Corp. v. I.C. Suatac Construction Ltd.*, 1976 CarswellOnt 50 (C.A.).

Justice Schabas also accepted that Justice Backhouse had not been operating under Ontario's family law regime, but under the *Divorce Act*, which limits the way in which orders may be varied (as noted above). As Justice Backhouse established a trust, it would be necessary to vary her order if Iafolla had any entitlement to those funds - and that had to be done within the matrimonial proceeding.

As a result, Iafolla's application was dismissed.

This result appeared very unsatisfactory, *especially* in a situation where, as here, the creditor was first in line, but where the trial judge was not told of the creditor's existence or execution. Lasota was, essentially, given a line-pass. In exercising its equitable

jurisdiction, a court must ensure fairness to *all* parties: *Evans v. Gonder*, 2010 CarswellOnt 1240 (C.A.). Iafolla, an accident victim and judgment creditor, ought to have been entitled to participate in the doling out of equitable relief.

Iafolla appealed, and argued that he was entitled to the full $180,670.15 pursuant to his rights under s. 2 of the *CRA*. He further argued that, to the extent it interfered with his rights as a creditor, the Divorce Order should be set aside. He argued that the effect of s. 2 of the *CRA* was to only give priority to lump sum support orders and periodic payments in arrears - but not future support - and he relied heavily on *Maroukis* and *Ferguson*, as he did before Justice Schabas.

Lasota again argued that the Court had no jurisdiction to vary the Divorce Order outside the divorce proceedings, and that the effect of Iafolla's appeal would be to vary the Divorce Order. She also argued that neither the writ nor the *CRA* created any substantive right to the funds for Iafolla. And, as she did below, Lasota relied on *Stevens* (where the trial judge distinguished *Maroukis* and *Ferguson* as cases determined under provincial family law statutes which did not permit retroactive orders, whereas the creation of a trust is based on the court's equitable jurisdiction). Again, in *Stevens* a retroactive vesting order was allowed to prevail over a writ filed by a bank.

The Court of Appeal concluded that the motion judge had erred in his interpretation of the jurisprudence and by not considering the court's duty regarding child support.

The Court of Appeal found that *Stevens* did not govern because in *Stevens*, the trial judge had found that a constructive trust operated as of the date of separation so as to vest the matrimonial home in the wife's name. Therefore, the wife in *Stevens* had title to the home *before* the execution was filed. But that was not the case here. Lasota did *not* have title to Antonov's share of the sale proceeds when the writ was filed.

However, the Court of Appeal also did not agree that *Maroukis* assisted Iafolla. There, a writ of execution was filed *before* the trial judge vested property in the name of the wife. On an application to the trial judge to "clarify the judgment" the trial judge vested the home in the wife's name as of the date of separation - which pre-dated the writ of execution. The Court of Appeal confirmed the vesting order but not the retrospective effect (and the Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeal). The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal confirming that, when property is divided on marriage breakdown, it does not vest until the order is made and there is no provision to retroactively vest property. Therefore, the wife's title was subject to a pre-existing execution filed with the sheriff.

The Court of Appeal distinguished *Maroukis* on the basis that the order here was for child support and spousal support, and the limits on retroactivity do not apply to a variation of child support. Child support is the right of the child, and "the presence of a child in divorce proceedings engages special duties for the court to ensure that arrangements are made for support." The trial judge, pursuant to the duties imposed by s. 11 of the *Divorce Act*, secured the sale proceeds of the home for future support including child support. There is no similar duty on the Court for property claims between the spouses or for spousal support. As found by the Court of Appeal, through paragraph 19 of the Divorce Order (above,) the trial judge "clearly intended to secure [Antonov's] share of the matrimonial home proceeds for the benefit of the child." This interpretation of s. 11 really does give retroactive and prospective child support a sort of "super priority."

The Court of Appeal was convinced that, in making her Order, Justice Backhouse had not been aware of the writ. And because the relief sought by Iafolla would effectively have eliminated the security Justice Backhouse put in place, the security the trial judge would have ordered had she known of the writ would likely have been different. For example, she might have considered s. 2(3)(2) of the *CRA* to comply with her obligation to prioritize child support.

The Court of Appeal held that the discovery of the writ of execution was a material change in circumstances giving rise to a variation application. Although the Court of Appeal does not emphasize the point, it is critical to remember *Lasotta's evidence before Justice Schabas was that she did not know about the writ*. Had she known of it, the finding that the writ was a material change would have been a very serious problem. The often-cited test for a "material change", is a change that is substantial, continuing and that *if known at the time*, would likely have resulted in different terms: *Willick v. Willick* (1994), 6 R.F.L. (4th)

161 (S.C.C.) at p. 688; *L.M.P. v. L.S.* (2011), 6 R.F.L. (7th) 1 (S.C.C.) at para. 32. Had Lasotta known about the writ, it could not possibly have been a material change.

Continuing with their material change analysis, the Court of Appeal noted that, on a variation application, the terms of the original order are presumed to comply with the objectives of the *Divorce Act*: *L.M.P.* at para 33. Then, once the material change is established, any variation should reflect the specific change in accordance with the statutory objectives set out in s. 17(4).

Finally, the Court of Appeal noted that the security ordered by Justice Backhouse applied to both the spousal and child support and that it was not apportioned as between them. However, at $17,000/year in child support alone, the child support obligation alone could easily exhaust the disputed amount.

In these circumstances, reasoned the Court of Appeal, the motion judge should have referred the matter back to Justice Backhouse to allow her to consider how knowledge of the writ might change her Order. That Lasota did not move for a variation was not material for several reasons.

Because s. 134 of the *Courts of Justice Act*, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, provides that the Court of Appeal may make any order that ought to or could have been made by the court appealed from, and because Justice Schabas could have referred the matter back to Justice Backhouse, it was appropriate that the Court of Appeal do exactly that.

In closing, we remind you of the sequence of events:

- **June 6, 2016**: Iafolla obtained a judgment against Antonov in the amount of $380,071.23 resulting from a car accident. At the time of the accident, Antonov and Lasota were married. Their matrimonial home was held in joint tenancy.
- **October 3, 2017**: Lasota commenced divorce proceedings against Antonov.
- **November 28, 2017**: Iafolla filed a Writ of Seizure and Sale against the matrimonial home.
- **July 25, 2018**: Antonov was ordered to make monthly child support payments of $1,429 and to pay child support arrears of $14,290; and spousal support in the amount of $3,191 per month, and to pay spousal support arrears of $24,360.

If you are a support claimant, be happy. If you are a judgment creditor of someone that is a parent, be worried.

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